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Abstract
Wemodel an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As in
the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver
who is to take an action which a¤ects the payo¤s of both players. However, in our model
the sender can communicate only through the use of discrete messages. The messages
are ordered by the cost incurred by the sender upon its transmission. We characterize
the resulting equilibria under a weak out-of-equilibrium condition. We apply the stronger
no incentive to seperate (NITS) condition to our model. We show that if the sender
and receiver have aligned preferences regarding the action of the receiver then NITS only
admits the most informative equilibrium. When the preferences between players are not
aligned, we show that NITS does not guarantee uniqueness and we provide an example
where an increase in communication costs can improve communication. As we show this
improvement can occur to such an extent that an equilibrium outperforms the Goltsman
et. al. (2009) upper bound for payo¤s in mediated communication.
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1 Introduction
A person will often use words to convey information about a complex and nuanced reality.
Words are discrete objects in the sense that their properties are very di¤erent from that of
real numbers. In this paper, we take the view that communication is necessarily discrete.
We analyze the implications of such discrete communication in a strategic interaction between
an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. In our model, the sender learns the state of
the world on the unit interval and transmits a discrete message to the receiver. In particular,
the sender incurs a cost in the transmission of the message. After observing the message, the
receiver is to take an action which a¤ects the payo¤s of both sender and receiver.
We rst consider a condition in which an out-of-equilibrium message does not induce an
action which is not induced in equilibrium. We refer to this condition as no new actions
(NNA). This condition roughly states that if a receiver ever observes an out-of-equilibrium
message then the receiver believes that, among the messages sent with positive probability,
that states are those associated with the most costly message. We characterize the equilibrium
under NNA. One advantage of employing NNA is that the multiplicity of equilibrium is
analogous to the multiplicity of the original cheap talk paper of Crawford and Sobel (1982)
(hereafter referred to as CS). Another advantage of employing NNA, is that the multiplicity
is helpful in demonstrating the utility of our subsequent equilibrium renement.
We also employ the no incentive to separate (NITS) condition of Chen et. al. (2008).
This condition roughly states that if the receiver ever observes an out-of-equilibrium message
then the receiver believes that the state is 0. We show that under NITS, if there is perfect
alignment between the preferences regarding the receivers action then the equilibria is the
one most preferred by the receiver: the state space is partitioned into the largest number of
possible elements. This result is analogous to that of Chen et. al. (2008) when NITS is
applied to the original cheap talk model.
If preferences regarding the receivers action are not aligned, we show that NITS does
not guarantee a unique equilibrium and we show that an increase in communication costs
improve communication. We also show that when preferences are not aligned there exists
an equilibrium in which the receivers payo¤s outperform the Goltsman et. al. (2009) upper
bound for payo¤s in such communication games.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related
literature. In Section 3, we introduce the model and in Section 4, we o¤er some preliminary
analysis. In Section 5, we characterize the equilibrium under NNA and discuss the merits
of doing so. In Section 6, we characterize the equilibrium under NITS where there is
perfect alignment of preferences and in Section 7, we examine NITS in the case of imperfect
alignment. In Section 8, we discuss the modeling choices specic to this paper and in Section
9, we conclude. In the appendix, we o¤er the proofs which were not presented in the body of
the paper. Further, we present an example where there does not exist an equilibrium under
an alternate, and arguably more reasonable, specication of NITS and we o¤er a proof that
an equilibrium under NITS implies that it is also an equilibrium under NNA.
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2 Related Literature
2.1 Cheap Talk and Related Models
The large strand of cheap talk literature was initiated by CS. The authors show that for mild
di¤erences in the preferences of receiver and sender, meaningful, albeit incomplete, commu-
nication can occur. CS shows that equilibrium always takes the form that the state space
is partitioned and the messages are sent such that a unique action is induced within each
element of the partition. Our equilibrium is analogous in that a unique action is induced on
each partition element.
A number of papers have extended the original CS model. For instance, Morgan and
Stocken (2003) extend the CS model to the case where there is uncertainty regarding the
degree of divergence between the preferences of the sender and receiver. Fischer and Stocken
(2001) model a situation where the sender has imperfect information about the state. Blume
et. al. (2007) modify the CS setup where communication errors (or noise) can occur. In our
view, the present paper shares the goal of these papers: to learn the signicance of a particular
assumption in the CS model. Here we seek to learn the importance of the assumption that
messages are plentiful and equally costless.
Blume et. al. (2007) demonstrated that a small amount of noise can improve communi-
cation in the CS model. In particular, the authors show that there is an optimal amount
of noise which maximizes the receivers payo¤s. Relatedly, Goltsman et. al. (2009) study
general communication in the CS model. The authors study mediation, whereby a neutral
third party (or mediator) will advise both of the players. Goltsman et. al. (2009) nd that
the payo¤s in the equilibrium with the optimal amount of noise found by Blume et. al. (2007)
is the the upper bound of payo¤s for the receiver in any mediated communication in the CS
setting. We provide an example of an equilibrium in which communication costs imply that
the receiver can attain a payo¤ above this upper bound.
The original CS model exhibits a large number of possible equilibria. Specically, CS
shows that for a given di¤erence in the preferences of the sender and receiver, if there is an
equilibrium where the state space is partitioned into a nite number of partitions (say n) then
there are equilibria which partition the state space into 1, 2, .., and n  1 elements. Like CS,
our model under NNA exhibits an analogous multiplicity.
As is often the case for multiple equilibria, researchers have sought to reduce the number
of cheap talk equilibria through renements.1 A recent innovation in this regard is the no
incentive to separate (NITS) condition of Chen et. al. (2008). NITS restricts attention to
equilibria in which it is not the case that the sender at the state s = 0 (with a state space of
[0; 1]) prefers to perfectly reveal the state. In their Proposition 3, the authors show that if the
monotonicity condition2 holds in the CS model (as it does in the commonly used "uniform-
quadratic" case) then NITS selects a unique equilibrium which is the most informative, i.e.
contains the largest possible number of partitions. We present a similar result, when there are
1For instance, see Banks and Sobel (1987), Cho and Kreps (1987), Farrell (1993), Kohlberg and Mertens
(1987), Matthews et. al. (1991).
2 In the literature, this is commonly refered to as Condition M .
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communication costs and the preferences are aligned, NITS admits only the most informative
equilibria. We also show that when preferences are not aligned and there are communication
costs, NITS does not guarantee uniqueness.
2.2 Costly Communication
We are not the rst to introduce costly communication into the CS model. Austen-Smith and
Banks (2000) and Kartik (2007) investigate the e¤ect of including both costly and costless
messages in the original CS model.3 In other words, these burning money papers ask, what
happens if we include the option of sending costly messages, in addition to the cheap, plentiful
messages of the CS model. By contrast, in our paper the message space is not uncountably
innite, but countably innite. Further, due to their cost only a nite number of messages
will be sent in equilibrium. In other words we ask, what happens if messages are relatively
scarce and increasingly costly to send. The burning money papers nd that the inclusion
of these additional costly messages can expand the set of equilibria and that there can be
regions of full separation. By contrast, we never nd full separation and in general the
presence of communication costs reduces the informativeness of communication. Given that
communication costs in our model tends to degrade communication and that our setup is
di¤erent from the burning money literature, it is rather surprising that we have identied
equilibria which outperform the Goltsman et. al. (2009) upper bound. While we share the
feature that we allow messages which cost the sender, roughly we investigate the case of a
smaller message space rather than the burning money literature which investigates the case
of a larger message space.
In Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) the sender incurs costs of e¤ectively communicating
information and the receiver incurs costs in absorbing information. In Dewatripont and
Tirole, information is either understood or not.4 By contrast, the states in our model are
better characterized by the degree to which they are understood. Additionally, in Dewatripont
and Tirole the sender and receiver necessarily have di¤erent preferences over the action of the
receiver. By contrast, we examine both the cases where they are aligned and are unaligned.5
Lastly, in our model the communication costs are exclusively incurred by the sender. We
focus on this case for the following reasons. When communication is discrete, it is not obvious
how to best model the cost associated with absorbing and processing messages. Even if a
suitable formulation could be found, a higher cost incurred by the receiver would presumably
induce a lower correlation between the state and the action. We suspect there exists a
prole of communication costs borne exclusively by the sender which would yield an identical
distribution of actions as in the model in which both sender and receiver incur communication
costs.
3The cost of these messages are unrelated to the unknown state of the world. See Spence (1973) for the
classic model of the case where the cost of transmitting a signal varies with the underlying state of the world.
Also see Gossner et. al. (2006). Kartik et. al. (2007) investigate a model of costly lying, credulous receivers,
and show that a separating equilibrium can emerge.
4See Austen-Smith (1994) for another costly communication paper in which information is either understood
or not.
5Also note that we are not the rst to model communication between a sender and receiver who have
identical preferences over the receivers action. For instance, Morris (2001) presents such a model in which,
due to reputation e¤ects, the sender might not truthfully reveal the state of the world. Also see Blume et. al.
(2007), Blume and Board (2010b), Che and Kartik (2009), Cremer et. al. (2007) and Jager et. al. (2009).
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To our knowledge, there are two costly communication papers in which there are shades
of understanding. In Calvo-Armengol et. al. (2009) the sender transmits a necessarily noisy
signal but can a¤ect its precision by a incurring larger communication cost. In our view,
this assumption is less appropriate when modeling discrete communication as it is not obvious
how to model noise when messages are discrete. In Cremer et. al. (2007) a xed number
of partition elements are optimally arranged in order to minimize communication problems
between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver who have identical preferences over
the action of the receiver. Like Cremer et. al., we nd that the equilibrium mapping from the
state space to the message space is not uniform. In Cremer et. al. this is due to the di¤erential
likelihood of events and in our paper it is due to the di¤erential cost of the available messages.
Also note that in Cremer et. al. the size of the language is exogenously given however in our
model the size of the language endogenously emerges due to the costs of communication.
3 Model
A sender (S) and receiver (R) play a communication game in a single period. Payo¤s for
both players depend on the receivers action a, as well as the state of the world s. The state
is an element of the closed interval [0; 1]. The receivers action space is R. The receivers
utility is:
uR(a; s) =  (a  s)2:
The receiver has ex-ante beliefs that the state is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]. The
sender observes the state and can communicate some information about the state to R by
sending a message m where m 2 M. Associated with each message mi, there is a cost c(i)
which the sender incurs when it is transmitted. The cost of communication (c : N)R) is
an increasing function of its index.6 Further, we require that c(i + 1)   c(i)   > 0. We
also assume that c(0) = 0. In a slight abuse of notation, we will refer to the case described
above as c > 0, the case where there is no communication costs as c = 0 and the case of both
communication costs and the absence of communication cost as c  0.7 The senders utility
is:
uS(a;mi; s) =  (a  s  b)2   c(i)
where b  0.
The senders strategy is  : [0; 1]! M and the receivers strategy is  :M! R. We
seek an equilibrium (; ) such that S chooses the optimal action, R chooses the optimal
action and Rs beliefs are derived from BayesRule wherever possible. We denote Rs beliefs
as (sjm).
Denition 1 For an equilibrium (; ) we require:
for each s 2 [0; 1], m=argmax
m0
uS((m0);m0; s)
for each m 2M, (m) = argmax
a0
Z
uR(a0; s)(sjm)ds
6See Vartiainen (2009) for a related notion of communication costs.
7Of course, since there is no outside option, adding any amount to the function c would not a¤ect our
results. We assume that c(0) = 0 in order to render meaningful our notation of c = 0 and c > 0.
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and that Rs beliefs are derived from Ss strategy using BayesRule.
4 Preliminaries
Before we o¤er a characterization of the equilibria, we introduce some notation and provide a
necessary condition.
Although our equilibria share some of the familiar characteristics of the cheap talk litera-
ture, the additional results which emerge will require the exibility provided by the notation
which we now dene. Like the CS equilibria, messages are sent on connected, nonoverlapping
intervals.8 Therefore, we may characterize an equilibrium by a set of cuto¤ states where we
denote the number of messages used in equilibrium as n by listing the order of the messages
messages m1; :::; mn. The messages induce a set of cuto¤ states which we denote:
0 = s1  s2  :::  sh  :::  sn  1 = sn+1:
Equilibrium is such that Ss messages are sent on intervals of the state space:
mh = 
(s) for s 2 [sh; sh+1)
and R best responds in a straightforward manner:
(mh) = a(sh; sh+1) = argmax
a0
Z h+1
h
uR(a0; s)(sjmh)ds (1)
where a(sh; sh+1) is the best response of R if the state is known to be between sh and sh+1
and therefore:
a(sh; sh+1) =
sh + sh+1
2
:
Denition 1 implies the arbitrage equation, also standard in the cheap talk literature. This
expression characterizes the equilibrium set of cuto¤ states:
uS(a(sh; sh+1);mh; s) = u
S(a(sh+1; sh+2);mh+1; s) for h 2 f1; :::; n  1g: (2)
We dene h to be the mass of states such that mh = (s). Since the messages are sent
on an interval of the state space and the states are distributed uniformly, h = sh+1 sh when
mh = (s) for s 2 [sh; sh+1) and mh 6= (s) for s =2 [sh; sh+1).
While subscripts refer to the order of the messages, we use superscripts to denote the cost
index of the message. Therefore, we denote the lowest cost message as m0, the next costly
message as m1 and so on. Correspondingly, we dene j to be the mass of states associated
with the message which has cost index j. An an equilibrium in which there are n actions
8See the appendix for the proof of Lemma 6 which shows that the equilibrium strategy for S entails sending
a message for states which are conntected intervals and Lemma 7 which shows that the intervals are not partially
overlapping.
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induced will obviously require that:
1 + 2 + :::+ n = 1 where h  0 for every h 2 f1; :::; ng (3)
We now provide a necessary condition for an equilibrium. Lemma 1 describes the relative
the size of two adjacent intervals. As in the CS model, for b > 0 the interval size is increasing in
its location on the state space. In other words, for b > 0 and c = 0, the intervals representing
larger numbers on the state space are larger than intervals representing smaller numbers. The
lemma also shows that the size of the interval is decreasing in the cost of the signal transmitted
on that interval.
Lemma 1 For any equilibrium (; ) where b  0 and c  0 in which there are n actions
induced, it must be that:
jh+1
2    ih2 = 4b hjh+1 + ihi+ 4 [c(i)  c(j)] for h 2 f1; :::; n  1g: (4)
Note that more costly signals are conserved: the cost of a signal is negatively related to
the size of the state space on which it is transmitted. Also note that when b > 0 and c = 0,
we are essentially in the CS model because expression (4) easily reduces to expression (21)
in CS. Therefore, when b > 0 and c = 0 the intuition behind the relationship between the
interval size and its location on the state space is identical to that in CS. Also note that
Lemma 1 together with the restriction that messages have a unique cost, implies that there
are no equilibrium mixed strategies for the sender.
5 Equilibrium Characterization under NNA
In this section we characterize the equilibrium under the no new actions (NNA) condition.
Under this mild restriction, we show that there will be a great deal of equilibria. From this
viewpoint, we can best glean the insights from the model and highlight the utility of our
subsequent renement.
The NNA condition species that, upon observing an out-of-equilibrium message, R seeks
to infer its origin among the messages which are sent with some probability. Among these
candidate deviations, R reasons that the deviation must have come from the states which are
incurring the highest communication cost in the transmission of the message.
No new actions: Given a strategy pair (; ), if R observes em where em =2 ([0; 1]) then
among the messages fmijmi 2 ([0; 1])g, R believes that the states are those associated with
the most costly message mj so that ([sjh; sh+1]jem) = 1.
As the name of the condition suggests, under NNA an out-of-equilibruim message does
not induce an action a which is not induced in equilibrium: there are no new actions induced
by an out-of-equilibruim message.
We now characterize the equilibria under NNA. Our rst result is that in equilibrium
there will be no unused cheap messages. As a consequence of this, we will say that there will
be no holes in equilibrium. Further, for any positive communication costs there will exist an
uninformative equilibrium where the least costly message is sent on all states.
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Lemma 2 Consider an equilibrium (; ) in which mi which is transmitted. Under NNA
then every mj where c(j) < c(i) is also used in equilibrium. Also for any b  0 and c > 0,
there will exist an equilibrium (; ) such that (s) = m0 for all s 2 [0; 1].
Proof: Consider an equilibrium (; ) in which the message mi is sent on some states,
however there are no states where message mj is sent such that c(j) < c(i). If mi is the
highest cost equilibrium message then S could deviate from sending mi by sending mj . This
deviation to mj would induce the same action as mi but could be sent with a smaller cost.
If mi is not the highest cost equilibrium message, then a protable deviation still exists. Say
message m0 is the highest cost equilibrium message, then S could deviate from sending m0 by
sending mj . This deviation to mj would induce the same action as m0 but could be sent with
a smaller cost. For both cases, there is a protable deviation for S, and so (; ) cannot
be an equilibrium. Now consider strategy pair (; ) such that (s) = m0 for all s 2 [0; 1].
All costly messages would not induce a di¤erent action from the receiver and yet the sender
would incur a cost of communication. Therefore, there is no protable deviation from this
completely uninformative strategy pair and so it is an equilibrium.
Next, we o¤er a denition which summarizes the necessary conditions for an equilibrium
under NNA.
Denition 2 A strategy pair (; ) is feasible if it satises expressions (1), (3), (4) and
additionally there does not exist an unused message mi and a used message mj such that
c(j)  c(i).
We now describe a procedure for determining the strategy pairs (; ) which are feasible.
From the lemma above, we note that the completely uninformative equilibrium will always
be feasible. Also by Lemma 2, the next step is to check whether a strategy pair including
messages m0 and m1 is feasible. To accomplish this, we need to check both whether the
strategy pair where m0 is sent on smaller states is feasible and whether the strategy pair
where m1 is sent on smaller states is feasible. If at least one is feasible, we proceed to the
next step, where we check whether strategy pairs including m0, m1 and m2 are feasible. We
need to check whether any of the 6 permutations of the three messages are feasible. If at
least one of the 6 possible permutations are feasible, we proceed to the set of messages m0,
m1, m2 and m3. We proceed in this manner until we arrive at a set of messages m0, ..., mk

such that none of the k! permutations are feasible.
We are ready to characterize the equilibria under NNA. As the following proposition
shows, each feasible strategy pair (; ) will form an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 If (; ) is feasible then it is an equilibrium under NNA.
As the above proposition implies, there are many equilibria when the NNA condition is
applied. This abundance of equilibria stands in contrast to our results in the following section.
There we show that for b = 0, the only equilibria which satises NITS are, the equilibria
which are most informative.
It is natural to ask, rather than NNA, why not use more neutral set of out-of-equilibrium
beliefs for the initial analysis of the model? In other words, are there other preferable
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alternatives to NNA. There seem to be two primary options in this regard. One option
is that out-of-equilibrium messages are simply ignored. In this case, an out-of-equilibrium
message will induce R to select an action of 0:5. Unfortunately, these beliefs imply some
undesirable equilibrium properties. For instance, it is possible that this condition would not
admit the informative equilibria which our subsequent equilibrium renement admits and so
this condition does not facilitate the exposition of our subsequent renement e¤orts. In other
words, although NNA can admit equilibria which are not optimal, NNA does not reject
equilibria which are optimal. The same cannot be said of the beliefs which ignore out-of-
equilibruim messages. Also, by ignoring out-of-equilibruim messages, R makes no attempt to
infer the origin of the message. Again in this regard, NNA is superior because there is an
attempt, albeit somewhat incomplete, to infer the origin of the out-of-equilibrium message.
Therefore, the restriction that out-of-equilibrium messages are ignored neither facilitates the
subsequent analysis nor has a rational appeal.
A second option is that an out-of-equilibruim message would induce beliefs that the mes-
sage was sent on the states which are incurring the smallest communication costs. This
second restriction is weaker than that of NNA, and much of the proceeding analysis would
hold, with the exception of the no holes result. However, again this alternate condition would
not facilitate the subsequent analysis because it admits equilibrium with holes. Further, the
weaker condition has less rational appeal because it would seem reasonable that the most
likely deviation would come from the states facing the highest, not lowest, communication
costs.
In summary, there seems to be no natural and neutral position to take regarding the
out-of-equilibrium messages. NNA seems to be more reasonable than simply ignoring out-
of-equilibruim messages or that the sender regards them as being sent on the states associated
with the lowest cost message. Further, NNA seems to provide the best setting from which
to view the utility of NITS.
6 Alignment of Preferences under NITS
Here we focus on the implications of the no incentive to separate (NITS) condition for case
where the preferences regarding the receivers actions are perfectly aligned (b = 0). In this
section, we show that NITS selects the equilibrium most preferred by the receiver.
We begin by noting that when b = 0, the order of the signals does not matter. We can
rewrite expression (4) in Lemma 1 for the case of b = 0 as:
(j)2   (i)2 = 4 [c(i)  c(j)] : (5)
As expression (5) suggests, the interval size on which a message is sent is determined only
by its communication cost and not by its location on the state space. As a result, expression
(5) does not contain subscripts. This step somewhat simplies the process of identifying
equilibria under NNA. However, the task is still di¢ cult because NNA only implies that
there are no holes. All other combinations of signals which are feasible are not ruled out.
Now we show that NITS greatly reduces the di¢ culty in identifying equilibria because only
a unique class of strategy pairs can form an equilibrium.
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If the incentives are aligned (b = 0) and there are n actions induced in equilibrium then
there are n + 1 states in which the sender has the most incentive to deviate.9 Therefore, as
a matter of convention, we select one of these n+ 1 states. Hence, NITS species that if an
out-of-equilibrium message is observed then R believes that the state is certain to be s = 0.
No incentive to separate: Given a strategy pair (; ), if R observes em where em =2
([0; 1]) then R believes that the state is certain to be s = 0, (0jem) = 1.
Note that our version of NITS is not identical to the original specication of Chen et.
al. (2008). Our specication focuses on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs which are implicit in
the original specication. The authors motivate their condition by suggesting that, upon
observing an out-of-equilibrium message, a natural place to expect such a deviation is from
the lowest state.10 Before the statement of NITS, we noted that if b = 0 and there are n
actions induced in equilibrium then there are n + 1 states in which the sender has the most
incentive to deviate. All of the results involving b = 0 would follow if we selected any of the
other such n states.
Before we state the main result regarding the equilibria under NITS, we provide the
following lemmas which are used in the proof of the result. The rst lemma which we present
shows that, similar to NNA, NITS does not admit equilibrium with holes. Specically, if
a message of a certain cost is used in equilibrium, it must be the case that all messages of
smaller costs are also used in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 Consider an equilibrium (; ) in which mi which is transmitted. Under NITS,
if b = 0 then every mj where c(j) < c(i) is also used in equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose that there is an equilibrium (; ) such that (s) = mi with cost c(i)
however there does not exist an s0 such that (s0) = mj and c(j) < c(i). If the signal mj is
observed, R believes that the state is certain to be s = 0. On the interval in the state space
for which the S sends message mi, Ss payo¤ cannot be higher than  c(i). By Lemma 8, S
has identical payo¤s at each of the states for which expression (5) is satised, including the
states 0 and 1. Therefore, at s = 0, the sender has a payo¤ of less than  c(i) and a protable
deviation is then to send mj . Therefore, (; ) cannot constitute an equilibrium.
We compare Lemma 2 with Lemma 3. Although the out-of-equilibrium beliefs are di¤er-
ent, we are guaranteed to not have holes in the equilibrium under either NNA or NITS. As
a result, we employ the same denition of feasible for NNA as NITS.
We now show that we are guaranteed a feasible strategy pair with a most costly message
mk such that there does not exist a feasible strategy pair with a most costly message mk
0
where k0 > k. If such a k is found then we say that the feasible strategy pair with a most
costly message mk is maximal. In the lemma below, we now show that we are guaranteed a
maximal, feasible strategy pair. Specically, if preferences are aligned then for any amount
of communication costs there is a feasible strategy pair (; ) which is maximal.
9See Lemma 8 in the appendix.
10The reader should consult Chen et. al. (2008) for further justication of the NITS condition.
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Lemma 4 If b = 0 then for any c > 0 there is always exists a maximal, feasible strategy pair
(; ) under NITS.
Proof: To check whether a (; ) is feasible we rewrite expressions (3) and (4). The
message which costs c(k) is sent on an interval of size k. The message which costs c(k   1)
is sent on an interval of size k 1 =
q
4 [c(k)  c(k   1)] + (k)2. The message which costs
c(k   2) is sent on an interval of size k 2 =
q
4 [c(k)  c(k   2)] + (k)2. The message
which costs c(2) is sent on an interval of 2 =
q
4 [c(k)  c(2)] + (k)2. The message which
costs c(1) is sent on an interval of size 1 =
q
4 [c(k)  c(1)] + (k)2. Finally for the costless
message, we write 0 =
q
4c(k) + (k)2. Therefore, we may write expression (3) asq
4c(k) + (k)2 +
q
4 [c(k)  c(1)] + (k)2 +
q
4 [c(k)  c(2)] + (k)2+ (6)
:::+
q
4 [c(k)  c(k   2)] + (k)2 +
q
4 [c(k)  c(k   1)] + (k)2 + k = 1:
When communication costs increase, k must decrease to zero in order for expression (6) to
hold. Recall that we required that c(i+1)  c(i)   > 0 for all i 2 f0; :::; kg. Therefore, we
can write the lower bound of each term in the left hand side of expression (6):p
4k +
p
4(k   1) +
p
4(k   2) + :::+
p
4(2) +
p
4 > 1. (7)
For every  , there is a k large enough so that expression (7) is satised. Therefore, we are
guaranteed a maximal, feasible (; ).
Intuitively, Lemma 4 shows that, for any communication costs when there are aligned
preferences, there exists an upper bound on the number of messages used in an equilibrium.11
It should not come as a surprise that full communication is not feasible when c > 0. However,
the straightforward characterization of equilibrium under NITS is perhaps surprising, given
the complicated nature of characterizing the equilibrium under NNA.
We are now ready for the main result of the section. Proposition 2 shows that we are
guaranteed an equilibria under NITS. Further, the only equilibria admitted under NITS
are the ones which are maximal among the feasible strategy pairs.
Proposition 2 If b = 0 then under NITS an equilibrium (; ) exists and it is a member
of the maximal, feasible class.
Proposition 2 shows that under NITS, only the equilibria with the largest possible number
of equilibrium messages does not have a protable deviation. The proposition uses the
language class because when b = 0, the ordering of the messages does not matter. Also, one
can see the full force of NITS by noting the di¤erence between the multiplicity of equilibria
in Propositon 1 and the uniqueness in Proposition 2.
11Note that a variant of Lemma 4 would hold for the case of b > 0. However, it is not necessary for our
present purposes and it would require a slightly di¤erent proof, therefore we do not provide it.
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Our Proposition 2 is reminiscent of Proposition 3 in Chen et. al. (2008). The authors
show that in the CS model where monotonicity holds, NITS admits only the most informative
equilibrium. In the notation of our model, Chen et. al. (2008) show that for b > 0 and c = 0
in the uniform-quadratic case, NITS uniquely selects the most informative equilibrium. Our
Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 of Chen et. al. (2008) becomes more surprising when we
provide an example which demonstrates that we are not guaranteed uniqueness when b > 0
and c > 0.
6.1 Simple Characterization
Here we focus on the case where preferences are perfectly aligned (b = 0) and communication
costs are linear in the index of the message. In other words, we assume that c(k) = ck where
c > 0. One benet of this exercise is that, for general communication costs, it is di¢ cult to
characterize the threshold level of costs which render a strategy pair (; ) feasible. However,
in the linear case the characterization is simple. If c  c(k) then a strategy pair (; ) which
employs a most costly message mk is feasible and if c > c(k) then such a (; ) is not feasible.
Lemma 5 If c(k) = ck and c > 0 then the cuto¤ cost for a strategy pair involving message
mk is:
c(k) =
 
1
2
Pk
j=1
p
j
!2
:
Proof: At the largest c such that the strategy pair involving message mk is feasible, it
must be that
 
k
2
= 0. By expression (5) it must be that,
 
k 1
2
= 4c,
 
k 2
2
= 8c, ..., 
1
2
= 4(k   1)c,  02 = 4kc. Therefore, we may write expression (6) in the case of linear
costs as
2
p
c(k) + 2
p
c(k   1) + 2
p
c(k   2) + :::+ 2
p
c(2) + 2
p
c(1) = 1:
and so the lemma is proved.
In order to provide some intuition for the characterization to this point, we provide the
following example. Given linear communication costs, the example illustrates that the equi-
libria under NNA possesses a large amount of multiplicity however NITS admits only the
most informative class of equilibria. The example also illustrates the utility of Lemma 5.
Example 1 Consider the case where c(i) = 0:01i and b = 0. Note that:
c(4) = 0:00662 < 0:01 < c(3) = 0:0145.
Under NNA there are four classes of equilibria where there are 1, 2, 3, and 4 messages used.
There are no feasible strategy pairs (; ) for the case of more than four messages. For the
rst equilibrium, m0 is sent on all states. For the second, there are two equilibria. There is
an equilibrium where m0 is sent on states [0; 0:52) and m1 on states [0:52; 1]. There is another
equilibrium where m1 is sent on states [0; 0:48) and m0 on states [0:48; 1]. Note that in each of
these equilibria 0 = 0:52 and 1 = 0:48. For the third case, there are six equilibria. There
is a monotonic equilibria where m0 is sent on states [0; 0:392), m1 on states [0:392; 0:729)
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and m2 on [0:729; 1]. The remaining 5 equilibria require that 0 = 0:392, 1 = 0:337, and
2 = 0:271. For the fourth case, there are 24 equilibria. There is a monotonic equilibria
where m0 is sent on states [0; 0:363), m1 on states [0:363; 0:665), m2 on [0:665; 0:892) and m3
on [0:892; 1]. The remaining 23 equilibria require that 0 = 0:363, 1 = 0:302, 2 = 0:227
and 3 = 0:108. Only the 24 equilibria in which four messages are sent, are admitted under
NITS.
7 Imperfect Alignement of Preferences under NITS
Recall Proposition 2 which demonstrated that the only equilibria admitted under NITS are
maximal and feasible. Similarly, Proposition 3 in Chen et. al. (2008) shows that in the CS
model where monotonicity holds, NITS admits only the most informative equilibrium. In
the notation of our model, Chen et. al. (2008) show that for b > 0 and c = 0 in the uniform-
quadratic case that NITS uniquely selects the most informative equilibrium. However, when
b > 0 and c > 0 we are not guaranteed uniqueness.
For the case of b = 0 and c > 0, the order of the messages does not matter as long as their
size is governed by expression (5). For the case of b > 0 and c = 0, the order of the signals
themselves does matter, but it does matter that the size of the intervals are increasing along
the state space. However, when b > 0 and c > 0 there is an interaction between these two
e¤ects, which might cause the nonuniqueness which we now describe.
The nonuniqueness can manifest itself in two distinct ways. First, there could exist
several equilibria with a given set of equilibrium messages, however these equilibria di¤er in
their informativeness. Second, there can exist equilibria which di¤er in the set of equilibrium
messages. The following example demonstrates this second aspect and the subsequent example
demonstrates the rst.
Example 2 Suppose that b = 0:245 and communication costs are c(i) = 0:01i. First,
there exists an equilibrium (; ) where two messages are used. Message m0 is sent on
s 2 [0; 0:03) and the m1 is sent on s 2 [0:03; 1]. The senders s = 0 equilibrium payo¤s
are  (0:015  0:245)2 =  0:0529, which is greater than deviation payo¤s of  (0:245)2   0:02
=  0:080. There also exists an equilibrium where m0 is sent for all states. The senders
s = 0 equilibrium payo¤s are  (0:5 0:245)2 =  0:065, which is greater than deviation payo¤s
of  (0:245)2   0:01 =  0:070.
The example above shows that when b > 0 there can exist equilibria with a di¤erent set of
messages. Our next example shows that when b > 0, there exist equilibria with identical sets
of messages yet di¤er in their informativeness. Also note that the following example shows
that when b > 0 there exists equilibria where an increase in communication costs will improve
communication.
Example 3 First, consider the costless communication case. When b = 0:2, and c(i) = 0,
there is only one outcome equivalent equilibria of the following form: a single action is induced
on s 2 [0; 0:1) and a single action is induced on s 2 [0:1; 1]. Message m0 induces a = 0:05 and
message m1 induces a = 0:55. In this case, E[ (a s)2] =  0:0608. However, when b = 0:2,
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and c(i) = 0:01i, there are two non-outcome equivalent equilibria. In the rst equilibria,
m0 is sent on s 2 [0; 0:12) and m1 on s 2 [0:12; 1]. In the second equilibria, m1 is sent
on s 2 [0; 0:08) and m0 on s 2 [0:08; 1]. In the rst equilibria, E[ (a   s)2] =  0:0569
and in the second, E[ (a   s)2] =  0:0649. If the cost of communication is increased to
c(i) = 0:02i then in the rst equilibria m0 is sent on s 2 [0; 0:14) and m1 on s 2 [0:14; 1],
implying E[ (a  s)2] =  0:0532. By way of comparison note that the equilibrium in which
there is no communication implies E[ (a  s)2] =  0:0833.
The above provides an example where an increase in communication costs can lead to an
improvement in communication. Also note that Example 3 contained an instance of two dis-
tinct equilibria, which share the set of equilibrium messages yet di¤er in their informativeness.
Finally, note that the last equilibrium described in Example 3 outperforms the upper bound
for payo¤s as found by Goltsman et. al. (2009).12 These authors nd that the upper bound
for the expected payo¤s of the receiver in mediated communication is:
E[ (a  s)2] =  1
3
b(1  b) =  0:0533:
What is the intuition behind the equilibrium which outperforms the Goltsman et. al.
(2009) upper bound? Note that there are two e¤ects at work. When b > 0, the sender
increases the intervals at the upper end of the state space, which reduces the expected payo¤
to the receiver. However, the communication costs induce the sender to decrease the interval
sizes on which the costly signal is sent. In the relevant equilibrium, the costly message is in
the upper end of the state space. Therefore, these e¤ects work in opposite directions, thereby
achieving an expected payo¤ above that of the upper bound for the case where communication
is not costly.
8 Discussion of Modeling Choices
Before we proceed to the conclusion, we discuss some of our modeling choices. Our state
space is designed to be richer than our message space13 as the state space is uncountably
innite and there are only a nite number of messages which can be transmitted with a
nite cost. We believe that this captures an important aspect of reality: it is impossible to
completely communicate the complexity of the real world, one may only increase the precision
of communication by expending more costly e¤ort. Also note that the size of the language
used in equilibrium arises endogenously. In our view, this captures another important feature
of reality: the precision of communication is determined by the costs incurred by the sender.
We assumed that there is only a single message associated with a particular communication
cost. This assumption yields several benets. First, there is no need to restrict attention to
pure strategies. In the case where there are several messages of a particular cost, obviously
the receiver would not employ mixed strategies in equilibrium, however this is not the case for
the sender. In this case, there exists equilibria in which the sender would use mixed strategies,
and NITS would not exclusively admit the most informative equilibrium. Further, even when
12This possibility was rst suggested by Andreas Blume.
13This assumption also appears in Jager et. al. (2009) and Lipman (2009). Blume and Board (2010a)
examine the opposite case where the message space is much larger than the state space.
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restricting attention to pure strategies, Proposition 2 would not hold, as we would need an
additional restriction to guarantee selection of the most informative equilibria.
Perhaps a natural questions is, why not model communication which is necessarily noisy
where the sender incurs a communication cost which is decreasing in the variance of the pos-
sible messages. Within this possibility, there arise some features which we nd unappealing.
First, suppose that the sender would costlessly specify the preferred action of the receiver
and the preferred amount of communication costs to a third party who would then add the
appropriate amount of noise to the message. As Blume et. al. (2007) showed, the quality of
communication is not monotonic in the amount of noise and communication is always enhanced
by a small amount of noise. It would seem to violate the spirit of the model that, even if
communication is costless, the sender would prefer to transmit a message with noise. Further,
this problem is not avoided if the noise is determined by the amount of e¤ort expended by the
sender. Therefore, we do not view this possibility as an adequate substitute for our modeling
choices.
As a second option, suppose that the sender would specify the upper and lower bound of
the possible states and incur a cost which is decreasing in the size of this interval. In this
case, we would have to assume that the receiver is unsophisticated. For instance, if the sender
wished to communicate the state, s = 0:315789215, the sender could send the message leading
to the possible interval [0:315789215; 1] and the sophisticated receiver would know that the
state is certain to be 0:315789215. To avoid these types of problems, we would either have
to model the receiver as unsophisticated or to model communication as we do here.
In both of the above options, the communication does not, in our view, resemble commu-
nication which is costly and discrete. Most notably the resulting equilibrium would be a fully
separating equilibrium whereby each state would induce a unique action by the sender. By
contrast, the equilibrium in our model is a pooling equilibrium in that several states induce
identical actions by the sender. This seems to be more consistent with our intuition regarding
communication.
9 Conclusions
We have modeled an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver
where communication is costly and discrete. We have characterized the equilibria under the
permissive no new actions (NNA) out-of-equilibrium restriction. When sender and receiver
have aligned preferences over the action of the receiver, we have demonstrated that the no
incentive to separate (NITS) out-of-equilibrium condition admits only the most informative
class of equilibria. This result is analogous to the application of NITS to the uniform-quadric
version of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Finally, for the case that preferences are not aligned, we
that NITS does not identify a unique equilibrium and that an increase in communication costs
might improve communication. Further, we show that this improvement can be large enough
so that it outperforms the Goltsman et. al. (2009) upper bound on costless communication.
There remain interesting questions which are unanswered. For instance, we have modeled
the interaction as a single repetition. However, we are interested to learn the equilibrium
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behavior where the interaction is repeated. There are three possibilities as the relationship
is potentially nitely repeated, innitely repeated or is repeated until the communication
attains some threshold. There exists an additional issue, which arises only in the repeated
version of the game: presumably there is a relationship between some publicly observable
signal and the optimal action for the receiver and also that the sender wishes to teach the
receiver this relationship. It would seem interesting to explore this learning. Additionally, we
are eager to learn the signicance of our assumption of quadratic preferences and a uniform
probability distribution. Finally, we are interested to know whether an environment with
several heterogenous senders and receivers, would produce a novel matching problem.
We are currently working on a version of our model where the sender imperfectly observes
the state. Our preliminary results, consistent with Blume et. al. (2007), suggest that a small
amount of this noise can improve communication.
Finally, Du¤y et. al. (2011) tests our model in an experimental setting. Like most
communication games, our equilibrium is quite complicated and this fact makes experimental
investigation di¢ cult. However, using the example of other such papers14 the authors test a
simplied version of the theoretical model presented above. Du¤y et. al. (2011) nds that the
size of the language arises endogenously, as it does in our paper. This suggests that further
study of costly and discrete communication could prove fruitful.
14For instance, Cai and Wang (2006) and Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009). Also see Blume et. al. (1998)
and Blume et. al. (2001).
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10 Appendix
The appendix is organized as follows. First we prove a few results about the nature of the
equilibria. Then we prove the results which appear in the body of the paper. Lemma 6
now shows that the intervals must be connected. Lemma 7 shows that the intervals cannot
partially overlap. Then, we prove Lemma 1.
Lemma 6 In any equilibria it cannot be the case that m 2 (s) = (s), m0 =2 (s) = (s),
m0 2 (s0) and m =2 (s0) where s < s0 < s.
Proof : Suppose there exists m such that () 1 (m) = (s1; s2) [ (s3; s4) with (s1; s2) \
(s3; s4) = ; and () 1 (m0) = (s2; s3).
If a(m) = a(m0) then there exists a protable deviation for S in choosing the cheaper
message. Now suppose that a(m) 6= a(m0). If a(m) < a(m0) and m0 2 (s) for s 2 (s2; s3)
as
 (a(m)  s  b)2   c(m) <  (a(m0)  s  b)2   c(m0) for s 2 (s2; s3)
then m0 2 (s) for s 2 (s3; s4) as
 (a(m)  s  b)2   c(m) <  (a(m0)  s  b)2   c(m0) for s 2 (s3; s4):
If a(m) < a(m0) and m 2 (s) for s 2 (s3; s4) as
 (a(m)  s  b)2   c(m) >  (a(m0)  s  b)2   c(m0) for s 2 (s3; s4)
then m 2 (s) for s 2 (s2; s3) as
 (a(m)  s  b)2   c(m) >  (a(m0)  s  b)2   c(m0) for s 2 (s2; s3):
The proof for the case of a(m) > a(m0) follows in the analogous manner.
Lemma 7 In any equilibria it cannot be the case that m0 2 (s0) where s0 2 [s1; s3) and
m00 2 (s00) where s00 = [s2; s4) where s2 < s3.
Proof : Suppose that there was such an equilibrium. The message m0 induces action a0
and message m00 induced action a00. Therefore the payo¤ from sending m0 is
UR(m0) =  (a0   s  b)2   c(m0)
and the payo¤ from sending message m00 is
UR(m00) =  (a00   s  b)2   c(m0):
For a0 6= a00 there is only a single state for which
UR(m0) = UR(m00)
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and therefore this cannot be the case. For a0 = a00 because s2 < s1 < s3 < s4 and c(m0) <
c(m00) then there exists a protable deviation by the sender to select the cheaper message.
Therefore there cannot exist such an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1: If there are n + 1 distinct actions induced by the sender then it
must be that there are n equations in expression (2). If this was not the case then Denition
1 would not hold. A typical such expression would be the cuto¤ state between intervals such
that mih 2 (s0) for s0 2 [sh; sh+1), mjh+1 2 (s00) for s00 2 [sh+1; sh+2):
 

sh + sh+1
2
  sh+1   b
2
  c(i) =  

sh+1 + sh+2
2
  sh+1   b
2
  c(j):
Which we rewrite as:
 

sh   sh+1
2
  b
2
  c(i) =  

sh+2   sh+1
2
  b
2
  c(j)
 
 ih
2
  b
2
=  
 
jh+1
2
  b
!2
+ c(i)  c(j)
so that
(jh+1)
2   (ih)2 = 4 [c(i)  c(j)] + 4b

ih + 
j
h+1

:

Lemma 6 showed that the intervals must be connected. Lemma 7 showed that the equi-
libria cannot be partially overlapping. Lemma 1 showed the relative size of the intervals as a
function of their position on the state space and the cost of message. Also note that Lemma
1 together with the assumption that a unique cost is associated with each message implies
that the sender will not employ a mixed strategy.
Proof of Proposition 1: Suppose that strategy pair (; ) is feasible. Given , there
does not exist a protable deviation from  regarding the messages used in equilibrium since
it satises expression (4). There does not exist a protable deviation for S by sending an
out-of-equilibrium message since there are no new actions induced by such a message. Given
 which satises Lemma 1 there is no protable deviation for R from  since it satises
expression (1). Therefore, the strategy pair (; ) is an equilibrium under NNA.
Lemma 8 If b = 0 and there are n actions induced then there are n+1 solutions to maxs(a(m0) 
s0)2 + c(m0).
Proof: Suppose that US(a; bm; s) > US(a; bm; s) where ([s; s)) = bm. As the distribution
is uniform, a = s+s2 . This implies that

s+s
2   s
2
>

s+s
2   s
2
, which cannot be the case.
Combined with expression (2), we have n+ 1 such solutions.
Hence, if b = 0 and there are n actions induced there are n + 1 states with the worst
ex-post payo¤. Naturally these are candidates for reasonable beliefs in the event of an out-
of-equilibrium message. Further, any of these n+ 1 states would be su¢ cient for the results
under NITS to hold.
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Proof Proposition 2: First we show that an equilibrium under NITS exists. As
Lemma 4 shows, there will always be a maximal, feasible strategy pair (; ). Suppose that
mk where k 2 N is the most costly message in this maximal, feasible strategy pair (; ). We
need to check that it is not protable for the sender at s = 0, to transmit a message more
costly than mk. Because (; ) satises expression (6) it must be that 0 =
q
4c(k) +
 
k
2
.
By Lemma 8, the equilibrium payo¤s for the S who received signal s = 0 is:
 

0
2
  0
2
  c(0) =  

1
2
  0
2
  c(1) = ::: =  
 
k
2
  0
!2
  c(k).
All of the messages used in equilibrium will not provide a protable deviation, therefore
we must use an out-of-equilibrium message to nd a deviation. Any deviation accomplished
by message mk+x where x > 1 can be accomplished by sending message mk+1. Therefore,
the cheapest (and therefore best candidate) out-of-equilibruim message is the message mk+1.
If such a message is sent, R would have beliefs that the message was sent by state s = 0.
Sending this message yields a payo¤ of  c(k + 1). Therefore, the signal will be protable
when:
 c(k + 1) >  
 
k
2
  0
!2
  c(k)
which we rewrite as: 
k
2
> 4 [c(k + 1)  c(k)] :
If a strategy pair involving a most costly message of mk+1 implies that ek+1 = 0, it must
also be that ek = 4 [c(k + 1)  c(k)]. However, when a strategy pair involving mk+1 is not
feasible, it must be that
 
k
2
< 4[c(k + 1)   c(k)] and so there is no protable deviation.
Therefore, when a strategy pair with a most costly message mk is feasible but the strategy
pair with a most costly message mk+1 is not, there is no protable deviation with a signal
more costly than mk. Therefore, there does not exist a deviation from the maximal, feasible
strategy pair where mk is the most costly message.
Now we will show that if b = 0 and there is an equilibrium with a most costly message mk
then NITS does not admit an equilibrium with a cheaper most costly message. For the case
of k > 0, suppose that a strategy pair with a most costly message mk is feasible and a strategy
pair with a most costly message mk+1 is not.15 Consider a candidate strategy pair involving
a most costly message of mk
0
where k < k0. This candidate equilibrium is characterized by:
bj2   bi2 = 4(c(i)  c(j)) for i; j 2 f0; ::; k0g
bk0 > 0b0 + b1 + :::+ bk0 = 1
15For the case that k = 0, then there is no possible equilibria in which a less costly signal is used.
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Each of the intervals in the candidate equilibrium are larger than their corresponding
intervals in the original equilibrium. Namely that bi > i for i 2 f0; :::; k0g. To see this, note
that the di¤erence between the size of the intervals on which messages mi for i 2 f0; :::; k0g are
sent are identical in the original and candidate equilibria. However, for the original equilibria
there are additional intervals to accommodate and so each of the intervals in the original
equilibria must be smaller than their counterpart in the candidate equilibrium.
For our original equilibrium is must be that: 
0
2
> 4[c(k)  c(0)] +

k
2
.
However, since c(0) = 0 and k  0 it must be that (0)2 > 4c(k). Because corresponding
intervals are larger in the candidate equilibria it also must be that
b02 > 4c(k). So we can
write the equilibrium payo¤s as:
US =  
0B@
b02
2
  0
1CA
2
<  c(k)
Deviation payo¤s are  c(k), therefore equilibrium payo¤s are less than deviation payo¤s and
so an equilibrium involving a most costly message of mk
0
cannot exist where there exists an
equilibrium with a most costly message of mk.
To see that each feasible strategy pair involving a most costly message mk uniquely deter-
mines the values of , we can rewrite expression (3) as:q
4c(k) +
 
k
2
+
q
4[c(k)  c(1)] +  k2 +q4[c(k)  c(2)] +  k2 + ::: (8)
+
q
4[c(k)  c(k   2)] +  k2 +q4[c(k)  c(k   1)] +  k2 + k = 1
The left hand side of expression (8) is strictly increasing in k and therefore must only hold
for a single value of k. And so the proposition is proved.
10.1 Example of non-existence of equilibrium under an alternate specica-
tion of NITS
Here we provide an example where there does not exist an equilibrium for an alternate, and
arguably more reasonable, specication of NITS. Recall that upon observing an out-of-
equilibrium message, the receiver believes that the state is s = 0. A common justication
for these beliefs is that s = 0 is the lowest state. However, in general that state does not
yield the lowest ex-ante payo¤s. Specically, the state s = 0 shares with other the states the
distinction of the smallest ex-ante payo¤s for the case of b = 0. However, this is not true
for the case of b > 0. When b > 0, the sender at state s = 1 has the lowest ex-ante payo¤s,
and this state would therefore seem to be the best candidate for beliefs upon observing an
out-of-equilibrium message. Although these beliefs appear to be reasonable, as the following
example shows, under these beliefs we are not guaranteed an equilibrium.
Example 4 Suppose that c = 0 and b = 0:2. Upon observing an out-of-equilibrium message,
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we assume that the receiver believes that the state is s = 1. Consider the strategy pair (; )
in which one message is sent on all states. This induces an optimal action of R of a = 0:5.
The payo¤ of the sender at state s = 1 is  0:49, whereas the payo¤ to the sender at state s = 0
is  0:09. If the sender at state s = 1 transmits an out-of-equilibrium message then a payo¤
of  0:04 can be attained and so a protable deviation exists. Therefore, the uninformative
equilibrium cannot exist. Consider the strategy pair (; ) in which two messages are sent.
According to expression (4) one message is sent on states [0; 0; 1) and the other is sent on
states [0:1; 1]. The payo¤ of the sender at state s = 1, is  0:4225 and the payo¤ of the
sender at state s = 0 is  0:0225. If the sender at state s = 1 transmits an out-of-equilibrium
message then a payo¤ of  0:04 can be attained and so a protable deviation exists. Note
that in both the strategy pair in which one message is transmitted and the strategy pair in
which two messages are transmitted, the S at the state s = 1 obtains the smallest payo¤s,
and in this sense is an appropriate candidate for the origin of an out-of-equilibrium message.
On the other hand, there does not exist an equilibrium under this alternate specication of
NITS when either one or two messages are transmitted. Additionally, a strategy pair (; )
involving three messages cannot satisfy expressions (1), (3) and (4). Hence, there cannot
exist an equilibrium with in which three or more messages are used. Therefore, there does not
exist an equilibrium under this alternate specication of NITS.
Although for b > 0 we are not guaranteed an equilibrium under this alternate specication
of NITS, we are guaranteed an equilibrium for the case of b = 0.
10.2 Equilibrim under NITS implies equilibrium under NNA
Although the following proposition is somewhat obvious, we o¤er it for the sake of complete-
ness.
Proposition 3 For b = 0, if a strategy pair (; ) is an equilibrium under NITS then it is
also an equilibrium under NNA.
Proof: Suppose that strategy pair (; ) is an equilibrium under NITS. Therefore,
(; ) is feasible and there is no protable deviation for the sender at s = 0. When we apply
the NNA beliefs to the strategy pair (; ), as there is no new actions induced, there cannot
be a protable deviation because there are no holes and therefore (; ) is also an equilibrium
under NNA.

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